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The Real Effects of Relational Contracts†
By Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson,
and Andrea Prat*
How important are factors such as “firm culture” and “employee engagement” in driving
firm performance? Increasing evidence from a
wide range of fields suggests that productivity
differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such as capital intensity, labor quality, and the structure of
demand (see, for example, Chew, Bresnahan,
and Clark 1990 and Syverson 2004). Several
researchers have suggested that one possible
cause of this productivity dispersion is the heterogeneous adoption of managerial practices
such as the use of high-powered incentive systems, explicit performance targets, selective
recruiting, and skills training (e.g., Kochan et al.
1986; MacDuffie 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and
Prennushi 1997; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007;
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012).
But a long tradition of work in organizational
behavior and organizational psychology suggests that the successful adoption of productivity
enhancing managerial practices requires complementary changes in the firm’s “culture” or in
the structure of social relationships within the
firm (see, for example, Blader and Tyler 2009;
Tyler and Blader 2000; Collins and Smith 2006;
Edmonson and Lei 2014; and Gittell 2002).
Recently Gibbons and Henderson (2013) have
suggested that one way to formalize this insight
is through a focus on the role of relational contracts within the firm. They suggest that com-

petitively significant managerial practices rely
for their effectiveness on the performance of
actions that cannot be specified in advance or
contractually verified ex post, citing, for example, Nordstrom’s instruction to its sales associates to “use good judgment in all situations.”
They hypothesize that this implies that the performance effects of management practices will
be contingent on the presence of appropriate
relational contracts within the firm.
This is an intriguing idea and consistent with
a number of qualitative accounts of the role of
relational contracts in shaping firm performance
(see, for example, Helper and Henderson 2014
and Gittell 2002). In this paper, we explore a
related question: do relational contracts have a
direct impact on performance? As far as we are
aware, this has not been the subject of any systematic empirical test. To this end, we report the
first results from a research program designed
to be a first step in this direction. We use the
quasi-randomized rollout across multiple sites
within a single firm of an intervention designed
solely to change the nature of the social relationships within the site—an intervention we
interpret as changing the relational contracts in
place—to ask whether changing relational contracts alone has an effect on performance. Below
we present some suggestive evidence from a
pilot study suggesting that they do. In a separate paper (Blader, Gartenberg, and Prat 2015),
we report findings from a second study that
explores the complementarities between managerial practices and relational contracts.
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I. Research Site and Design

Our research site is a large US trucking company that operates in the less-than-truckload
segment of the industry, transporting shipments
that are smaller than a full truckload and larger
than individual parcels. The company employs
more than 10,000 drivers, nearly all of whom are
non-union hourly employees, across about 300
452
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sites in the United States and Canada. A central
feature of these sites—and one that is crucial to
our research design—is that they operate essentially independently. This feature allows us to
employ research designs that randomize various
treatments across sites to unpack the effects of
relational contracts.
The company is arguably in the middle of transitioning from one relational contract to another
via a decade-long program to roll out Lean
Management (“lean”). Lean is a widespread
management philosophy, inspired by the Toyota
Production System, that encompasses both extensive cultural interventions and a broad array of
formal practices. Our company divided their lean
rollout into five phases and, at the time of our
research, was midway through the first phase.
Critically, this first phase involves no implementation of formal lean practices or changes
to employee incentives. Instead, it consists primarily of introducing employees to lean principles, including how “continuous improvement”
(the organizing idea behind Lean Management)
occurs primarily through teamwork, collective
responsibility, and the empowerment of frontline workers. In a relational contract context,
this first phase can be interpreted as a costly
effort by management to announce a change in
the prevailing contract. This effort by the company is consistent with Gibbons and Henderson
(2013) and Helper and Henderson (2014), both
of which draw on prior research to suggest that
the successful implementation of lean techniques requires the development of a complementary set of relational contracts.
For the purpose of our research, therefore, we
interpret this first phase as a relational contract
intervention. We refer to it as “the lean intervention” or “lean,” even though Lean Management,
in its fullest sense, is far broader and encompasses an extensive set of formal practices to
manage the production process (which had not
yet been initiated at our company). For this initial pilot study, we ask: Does the lean intervention alone have a direct effect on performance?
A. Preliminary Results
To identify the causal impact of a relational
contract on performance, we require a research
design that randomly assigns a relational contract intervention to some sites and no intervention to others. A study of this nature is currently

453

underway. Since the results of that study are
pending, here we report preliminary findings
based on a cross-sectional comparison of sites
that had and had not already received the lean
intervention when our study commenced. From
discussions with management, we believe that
this previous assignment of lean can be plausibly
considered quasi-random in that, after an initial
pilot program in 2011, the lean rollout schedule
was chosen solely to reduce the travel burden on
the regional lean manager, and not by the anticipated success of lean at any particular site.
We record lean as a binary variable, capturing
whether or not the first phase of lean had been
initiated at the site at least three months before
our data collection. For performance measures,
we consider three measures of driver efficiency
that directly reflect fuel usage and truck wearand-tear: (i) Gap Score, the percentage difference between the average actual and “potential”
miles per gallon expended on a given route;1 (ii)
Excess Idle Time, a measure of the minutes that
an engine idles beyond a designated time period,
thereby wasting fuel, and (iii) Total Fuel Lost,
an aggregate measure of all the fuel wasted from
idling, inefficient shifting, speeding, and gearing. A higher value for any of these measures
represents worse performance.
For this analysis, we use data from daily
driver routes obtained between September 2013
and April 2014 across 73 lean and nonlean sites
and 3,179 individual drivers. These sites comprise the control group of a separate study—
discussed below—in which we randomized the
public posting of driver performance results
across lean and nonlean sites. Because those
performance postings affected driving behavior,
we exclude the treated sites from this analysis.
The histograms shown in Figure 1 show the
average performance in lean and non-lean sites.
We can see from these raw comparisons that
driver performance in lean sites is consistently
more efficient than in non-lean sites.
Why might the lean intervention have this
effect? On its face, this result is puzzling since
no formal changes to operating practices or
incentives were implemented. Our studies suggest that, under the lean relational contract,
1

The potential miles per gallon is calculated by the
truck’s on-board computer on the basis of optimal shifting and speed patterns, given weather conditions and route
characteristics.
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Panel A. Gap score

Panel B. Excess idle time

Gap between potential
and actual mpg

Panel C. Fuel lost

Engine idle time
beyond threshold

Fuel wasted
in gallons

2.55

0.154

2.5

0.152

2.45

0.15

2.4

0.148

2.35

0.146

0.3634

2.3

0.144

2.25

0.3633

0.142

2.2

0.14

2.15

Nonlean sites

Lean sites

0.138

0.3637
0.3636
0.3635

0.3632

Nonlean sites

Lean sites

0.3631

Nonlean sites

Lean sites

Figure 1. Driver Performance at Lean and Nonlean Sites

drivers adjust their beliefs that the company
values and respects, rather than exploits, them.
The observed effect is consistent with Halac and
Prat’s (2014) prediction that workers’ belief in
the firm’s management system is a determinant
of both effort and performance.
Interview data obtained from conversations
with individual drivers and supervisors are also
consistent with this idea. For example, one
supervisor noted how lean had changed his leadership style:
These guys will do anything for me, and
they’ll do absolutely nothing for other
people. And I learned a lot of that from
lean because lean has made me softer, it
really has. I used to be hard as rock and
now I feel like I’m a sponge … I still have
that same pride but it’s—my interaction
with people is so much different, it’s so
much different. You’re not treating them in
a negative way or a negative manner and
that’s—I was hard as a rock in my numbers produced … and if somebody didn’t
want to get on board with me on my team
in all likelihood it probably wasn’t going
to be a very good day for that person.
Now, it’s with everybody being involved
instead of just me running the show, it’s
totally different.
And a driver noted how lean had changed
relationships within the site:
I think the meetings and stuff have actually helped just getting people working
together. So in the lean team, I think there’s

Distribution of employee engagement
0.5

Nonlean sites
Lean sites

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
1

2

3

4

5

Engagement index
Figure 2. Distribution of Driver Engagement in Lean
and Nonlean sites

actually a good amount of camaraderie
going on. So I think that’s actually been
good. Now some people I didn’t really get
along [with, we] are working together.
For quantitative evidence of this explanation,
we worked with the company to administer an
employee engagement survey on a subset of
sites. The survey was individually identified
in order to match responses to driver performance. The survey itself includes 37 questions
on employee attitudes scored from 1–5, where
5 is the most positive response. For simplicity,
we construct an engagement index that is the
average of all 37 questions. Figure 2 shows the
distributions of driver engagement for lean and
nonlean sites. The distribution of driver engagement is noticeably shifted right for drivers in
lean sites and has a smaller left-handed tail.
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Figure 3. Driver Performance by Engagement Decile

Table 1—Lean, Driver Engagement, and Performance
Dependent variable

Gap score
(1)

Lean
Engagement index (Z)
Constant
Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

−0.2016*
(0.1148)
3.4083***
(0.4959)
Yes
21,669
0.112

Excess idle time
(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.1342
(0.1195)
−0.0669*
(0.0368)
3.4361***
(0.5415)

−0.0498**
(0.0208)
0.0378
(0.0695)

−0.0315
(0.0232)
−0.0182**
(0.0073)
0.0454
(0.0724)

Yes
21,669
0.121

Yes
21,669
0.067

Yes
21,669
0.073

Fuel lost
(5)

−0.0890***
(0.0301)
0.3808**
(0.1476)

(6)

−0.0683**
(0.0320)
−0.0206*
(0.0114)
0.3893**
(0.1612)

Yes
21,669
0.171

Yes
21,669
0.177

Notes: OLS estimates. Observations represent city driver-days for the subset of observations with associated survey results.
Engagement index is the z-scored average of the 37 survey questions. Controls include demographic measures (race, age, tenure), number of trucks at site, route distance, route potential MPG, and fixed effects for day of week, calendar date, date since
EOBR rollout, and region. Errors clustered by site.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

Figure 3 shows driver performance by engagement decile, relative to the lowest decile. While
purely a correlational result, this figure shows
a clear association between driver engagement
and performance.
Table 1 shows the association between lean,
driver engagement, and performance. Without
accounting for engagement, lean sites are associated with better performance. When engagement is included in the model, however, this
association attenuates to insignificance.
Together, these results show that the lean
intervention is associated with higher employee
engagement, which is in turn correlated with

better driving performance. Applying a causal
interpretation, based on the quasi-random lean
assignment, the findings become intriguing for
two reasons: first, they imply that relational
contracts, independent of formal practices, can
influence performance. Second, they suggest
that relational contracts can, in fact, be changed
by managers, albeit in a costly, time-consuming
way.
II. Directions for Further Work

These results are intriguing but incomplete. First, we report average differences in
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performance levels across two quasi-randomized groups of sites. A more convincing test,
currently in process, is to report performance
changes across randomized groups. Second, a
number of important research questions remain
unanswered. For example, how do relational
contracts interact with formal management
practices? How do they interact with other
aspects of job design, such as formal incentives,
the degree of workplace decentralization, and
the nature of actual work performed? How are
they related to market conditions, such as the
intensity of competition, uncertainty, and technological advancement? Finally, more work is
required to understand the contracts themselves.
What is the actual underlying mechanism by
which they influence productivity? And finally,
how can they be credibly altered and sustained?
Some of these questions we hope to explore at
this site and in other settings. We also hope this
work attracts broader interest and other empirical research on the topic.
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